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Abstract 
 
This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed 
companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms 
in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership 
structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. 
Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership 
concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, 
corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been 
observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the 
H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be 
concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between 
institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between 
managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A nature of a relationship between an ownership structure and the dividend policy proceeds from 
asymmetric information and agency problem existing potentially inside enterprises which have 
separations between ownership and management rights. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
agency costs of equity could be reduced by paying higher dividends for its shareholders because it 
will result in lower “discretionary” cash flows available to be squandered away by managers. On the 
other hand with the payment of dividends managers are forced to access capital market to raise 
external capital to replenish fund paid out in dividends and it will reduce the opportunity for 
manages to use free cash flow for their perquisites activities as a results of asymmetric information 
(Abdullah, Ahmad and Rosland (2012, Easterbrook (1984), Rozeff (1982)). The dividend payout is 
considered as the primary control mechanism in which shareholders could limit ability of managers 
to abuse the free cash flow (Kuma, 2004). However, some empirical evidences suggest that share 
ownership is highly concentraded in developing countries such as Sri Lanka (Samarakoon, 1999). 
The managerial owners, individual owners, institutional owners, foreign owners and family owners 
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are present in most companies. These different kinds of owners in a company setting may have 
different interests with their power and authority. The composition of ownership structure does not 
influence dividend policy uniformly over the countries and hence the impact of dividend policy to the 
ownership structure has been an interesting topic in the recent past across countries.  
In Vietnam, researches about an effect of ownership structure on dividend policy are still 
limited both in size and research method. Hai Ly (2015) has shown that there were few researches 
about this matter in Vietnam, including Hai Ly (2011) & Duong Kha (2012) with sample sizes just 
covering a part of listed companies in Vietnam. Additionally, those researches used the least 
square method for skewed data or period, so rejected pressure of obscurely specific factors inside 
businesses, there’re one of reasons causing internal problems. On the other hand, results from 
developed countries tent to be more clear and stable than developing countries. Even researches in 
the same nation, there can bring different results. That recommends us for some remarkable 
problems. First, there need to select a suitable model in order to deal with internal problems on 
research. Second, the effect of ownership structure can depend on specific characteristics of 
national economy and culture (such as, a family ownership is very popular in Korean while a State 
ownership is so strong in China). Furthermore, a sample selection and timing study also can be 
effect on study result. 
Specifically, in this study, the authors showed in 4 ratios which are less used in many previous 
studies about the effect of a centralization level of an enterprise’s ownership structure and dividend 
policy, Herfindahl index ratios (or H-index). We estimated Herfindahl index in every companies for 
all big shareholders (HINDEX_ALL), 5 major investors (HINDEX_LARGE),  shareholders who are 
institutional investors (HINDEX_INSTI), and shareholders who are foreign investors 
(HINDEX_FOREIGN). Combining with the regression method for pannel data including the fixed-
effect regression & GMM, with sample including 642 listed companies on HOSE & HNX. The result 
individually showed below with section 2 – analyzing study overview, section 3- presenting study 
method, and section 4, 5 – indicating the results of the effective level between ownership structure 
and dividend policy of Vietnamese companies. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theory perspective 
 
The signaling theory, free cash flow theory and agency theory are the main theoretical backbones 
of the dividend policy. The agency theory (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is the most 
principal theory used in a large number of studies involving ownership structures and affecting the 
dividend payout of firms. This theory stemmed from the conflicts in the relationships of the 
company, especially the principal-agent relationship between the shareholders (principal of the 
company) and executives (the agent). Managers take the duty of maximizing value for the owners. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the executives can operate the company in the way that benefits 
themselves instead of the owners whom they represent for, especially if the manager is paid and 
their interest is unrelated to the company, resulting in agency costs. 
The agency theory by referring to ownership concentration builds up two views on relationship 
between ownership concentration and the dividends. One perspective is that the conflict of interest 
arises between managers and the owners of the company can be alleviated through concentrated 
ownership (Harada & Nguyen, 2011). This predicts the positive impact of concentration ownership 
on dividends (Abdullah, Ahmad, & Roslan, 2012; Harada & Nguyen, 2011). Another perspective of 
this relationship is that concentration owners prefer to have more private benefits from existing free 
cash flow and it would lead to lower the dividend payments (Harada & Nguyen, 2011). This is 
predicted the negative relationship between concentration ownership and the payments of 
dividends. 
Free cash flow theory argued that the agency cost can damage to the company in form of 
profit distribution. Free cash-flows from business operations and corporate profits, rather than 
redistribute to the owner in a legitimate manner through dividends or buy back shares, the 
administrator put into unnecessary or wasteful investment, causing damage to shareholders. 
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Therefore, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that firms should pay dividend as it may be useful in 
reducing the free source of cash to be used on wasteful investment. However, the more 
concentration ownership structure, the more motivated shareholders to keep a close control on 
executive actions, is making a difficulty for managers to commit harmful behaviors to the public, 
what benefit him. Thus, the concentration level of the corporate ownership structure has a positive 
correlation with the dividend ratio of the firm. In addition, when managers have a vested interest in 
the company, they are motivated to maximize the value of the company. Therefore, the 
management’s stock ownership can have the same impact on the dividend payout ratios of the 
business.  
Signalling Theory (Ross, 1977) advocates that managers are the controllers in a company 
and stockholders are the owners of the firms and there is an information asymmetry between these 
two parties. Managers have more firsthand information about the firm than its shareholders do but 
they are not always willing to public for the shareholders (Miller & Rock,1985). Hence the dividend 
policy could be considered as the signal for the firm’s future projection proficiently (Miller and Rock 
(1985)) and Li and Zhao (2008) argued that dividend policy plays a leading role because it can be 
used to convey information to the shareholders. For example, the issuance of additional shares to 
raise capital may be seen by investors on the market as if the stock price of the company is higher 
than its real value or the decision to buy back shares in the market may be considered as a positive 
signal, the company is returning free cash flow to its owner, meaning less free cash flow for more 
expensive investment activities, etc. 
However, the different types of ownership structure provide different information in the market 
from the financial decisions of the management. For instances, Joh and Ko (2007) pointed out that 
for household-owned enterprises, a decision to distribute profits by acquiring stocks was admitted 
by different ways in the market when the ownership structure varied. As for a centralized ownership 
structure, the stock acquisition to distribute cash flow is well received; for the purpose of the 
acquisition will not be for the benefit of large shareholders and block minority shareholders. 
Meanwhile, as for family-owned businesses with dispersed ownership structures, the stock 
acquisition is considered as a method to protect the interests of the family and assessed negatively 
by the market. 
 
2.2 Empirical evidences 
 
Studies on this topic focus on two main aspects: (1) how does the ownership concentration level 
affect the corporate dividend payout? (2) How does the existence of large shareholders influence 
dividend payout? The research divides the existing forms of large shareholders into the following 
main categories: State shareholders, family shareholders, institutional shareholders and foreign 
investors. The results focus on the following: 
(1) How does the ownership concentration level affect the corporate dividend payout? 
It was argued that the more concentration the shareholder structure, the more likely it is 
that the business will tend to have less transparency, which results in a representative 
capital of the business will face an extreme conflict of interest, the large shareholders 
tend to gain more personal benefit through unclear legal transactions, so lower the 
dividend. Porta (2000) compared the dividend performance in 33 countries and found that 
the higher the concentration of shareholder structure, the lower the dividend ratio. 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) studied the effect of shareholder concentration and 
dividend levels on firms of the same scale showing that the larger the shareholder 
dispersion level is, the higher dividend is paid, a company with a high concentration of 
shareholders. 
Maury and Pajuste (2002) conducted research with companies in Finland and also 
showed the similar result indicating the negative relationship between the concentration of 
shareholder structure and dividend ratio, in particularly, the lower of dividend payout 
ratios when a leader is also as the large shareholder. Harada and Nguyen (2006) 
conducted a survey of the companies’ dividend policy in Japan, Mancinelli and Ozkan 
(2006), in the Italian stock market, Mehar (2005) also gave the same result to the 
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relationship between the concentration of shareholder structure and the distribution of 
profits. 
However, some studies just pointed to an opposite of the hypothesis. Naceur (2006) 
conducted research with companies in Tunisia and found that the concentration of 
shareholders had no significant impact on their dividend payout ratios. This result is 
further supported by another conducted on the Morocco stock market by Aguenaou 
(2013). This study also fails to show the relationship between dividend policy and the 
level of ownership structure. 
(2) How does the existence of large shareholders influence the dividend payout? 
First, it is believed that enterprises, which have large state shareholders, are often 
stagnant, lack of transparency, lack of operation ideas, affected a lot by politic, have more 
social society activities, & create jobs instead of focusing on business. Therefore, with the 
type of enterprise in which the State is a major shareholder, it was expected on the 
negative relationship of dividend payout ratios. Specifically, Nasr (2015) researched about 
a situation of profits sharing of equitized enterprises from 43 countries, and found that 
dividend policy had a negative relationship with share holding ratio of the State inside the 
companies. Shubiri (2012) studied about the profits sharing situation of businesses in 
Jordan, Wang (2011) with listed companies in China that also showed similar results with 
what the hypothesis set out. 
Second, institutional investors, which are usually investment funds, tend to invest in long-
term, & look for company’s sustainable growth. These funds will often be more 
transparent in management information than the others. In addition, to mitigate the 
problem of capital representatives, these institutional investors tend to pay high dividends 
to provide greater satisfaction to small shareholders. Short (2002) showed a positive 
relationship between the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the company's 
dividend payout ratio, the sample of which is done by companies in the UK. Many other 
studies supported the hypothesis that major shareholders are institutional investors. 
Specifically, Masry (2008), Azzam (2010) with companies in Egypt, Elston (2004) with 
companies in Germany, Wiberg (2008) with companies in Sweden, Sharif (2010) with 
companies in Iran; they all pointed out the positive relationship between the dividend 
payout ratio and the shareholding percentage of institutional investors. 
Third, if large shareholders are family members, this fact will lead to two common 
problems: lack of transparency of information and lack of managerial experience. 
Therefore, the initial impact can be seen as the company will be affected in terms of 
business efficiency leading to low profit sharing. The results of the empirical study show 
lots of evidence in favor of this argument. Nawaiseh (2013) researched on dividend policy 
of Jordanian businesses found that the ownership ratio of large family shareholders would 
have the opposite relationship with dividend payout ratio. Aguenaou (2011) also pointed 
out similar results when looking at listed companies on the Casablanca Stock Exchange 
in Morocco. Pindado (2011) researched about companies in the Euro area, & found that 
the larger the company's ownership ratio, the higher the dividend payout ratio. 
Fourth, some empirical results supported that if the company has major shareholders are 
foreign investors, which will prove that the transparency of the company's information is 
relatively good. Assuming that foreign investors are experienced in controlling corporate, 
it will attract more and more domestic and foreign investors. It will help to improve the 
business efficiency, then leading to a problem that the profits sharing ratio to 
shareholders will be high. A number of key studies have been conducted, such as Warrad 
(2012), which studied Jordan's dividend policy, found that there was a correlation 
between the shareholding ratio of large foreign shareholders and the dividend payout 
ratio of the business. The studies of Nawaiseh (2013) with companies in Jordan, Vinh 
(2014) with Vietnamese companies, Chai (2010) with companies in Korea, also gave 
results with the same trend, & supported that the view of the hypothesis given is 
reasonable. 
To sum up, with the theoretical frame that set out and illustrated by empirical findings, it is 
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clear that the ownership structure influences the dividend policy of the firm; however, it may be 
different because of the ownership characteristics of the different business groups and the internal 
factors of the business. This paper sheds light to the relationship between ownership structure and 
dividend policy of Vietnamese firms. Specifically, we examine (1) the impact of ownership structure 
on the probability of dividend payment in Vietnam, and (2) whether ownership structure affects the 
decision of firms on the amount of dividend payment. Toward this end, we test the impact of the 
ownership structure in both aspects: ownership concentration and ownership types. Subsample 
tests are also used to examine whether the results are driven by companies listed in HOSE and 
HNX . To the best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the few studies examining the relationship 
between ownership structure and firms’ financial decisions in Vietnam. Hence, our study contributes 
to the gap of knowledge on the effect of ownership structures on various aspects of firm 
management decisions in East Asia region. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 
The ownership structure affects the coporate dividend payout in 2 aspects: First, it is an ability of 
dividend payout, and second, it is the quantity of dividend payout of enterprise. The centralized 
ownership structure, the State ownership and domestic institutional ownership all tend to manage 
business operations and administrators more tightly.Thanatawee (2013, 2014) found that the higher 
level of centralized ownership, the State ownership and domestic institutional ownership ratios are, 
the bigger enterprise will willing to payout dividends. Sharma & Wadwa (2013) also found that a 
positive correlation between institutional ownership and dividend policy of Indian companies. In 
conclusion, with the level of centralized ownership, institutional ownership and the State ownership, 
we established those hypotheses below: 
- H1: the level of centralized ownership structure positively impacts on the ability of dividend 
payout and a dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
- H2: the State ownership has a positive effect on the ability of dividend payout and a 
dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
- H3: the institutional ownership affects positively the ability of dividend payout and a 
dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
The foreign ownership has an unobvious effect on dividend policy. On the one hand, an 
administrator who has an ownership, will tend to payout more dividends, minimize over-investment 
as well as help for him and other shareholders to receive income from free cash flow. On the other 
hand, the manager can also want to lower dividend payout in order to keep a large amount of cash, 
improve self-interest investments and cause damage for other small stockholders. While Ullah, Fida 
& Khan (2012) found out a negative impact on management ownership rate with the ability of 
dividend payout, Nasrum (2015) showed a positive correlation. Therefore, we set up hypotheses: 
- H4: the management ownership positively impacts on the ability of dividend payout and a 
dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
- H5: the management ownership has a negative effect on the ability of dividend payout and 
a dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
- In addition, some researches of Vietnamese market often can’t find out the specific impact 
between the ownership structure and some aspects of financial decisions of business. 
Thereby, the authors set up hypotheses below: 
- H6: the ownership structure does not impact on the ability of dividend payout and a 
dividend payment level of Vietnamese enterprises. 
 
3.2 Sample selection 
 
The research sample used by the authors is all non-financial companies listed on Ho Chi Minh City 
Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX). Financial companies such as 
banks, securities companies, investment funds and insurance companies that have distinct 
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characteristics in ownership structure, are subject to separate management and use their own 
method of accounting are not considered in this study. The research sample collected during the 7-
year period from 2009 to 2015 includes 642 non-financial enterprises with a total of 4,494 
observations based on panel data (company - year). 
Data on the ownership rate of listed companies are mainly collected from two sources: the 
ownership database of listed companies of Vietstock.vn and the database of ownership of JSC 
Securities VNCIRECT. The databases of Vietstock.vn provide data on the volume of shares owned 
by the state, institutional investors, foreign investors, large shareholders and the board of directors. 
The databases of stock company VNDIRECT provides data on the total number of outstanding 
shares of listed companies in Vietnamese stock market. Besides, the authors consulted and used 
the data on the list and ownership rate of major shareholders from Stockbiz.vn database. Stock 
price data is also derived from historical price data of VNDIRECT Securities Joint Stock Company. 
Financial data of enterprises listed on two Stock Exchanges are hand-collected from the 
consolidated financial statements by year from 2009 to 2015, including the data from the balance 
sheet, income statement, cash flow statement and note to financial statements. These reports are 
downloaded from the official website of the two Stock Exchanges: Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(www.hsx.vn) and Hanoi Stock Exchange (www.hnx.vn), particularly, in the section listed 
companies, shares and financial status of each stock code. 
 
3.3 Variables and measurement 
 
3.3.1 Main dependent variables 
 
Distribution of profits in Vietnamese enterprises is mainly based on the distribution of dividends. 
Therefore, the authors used three main dependent variables to measure the profits distribution. As 
for the ability to pay dividends, the authors used the Dummy variable PAYOUT, the value is 1 if the 
company paid dividends in that year and 0 if the company does not pay dividends. In terms of 
dividend payment level, there are two main dependent variables: POR (Payout ratio) and DPS 
(Dividend per share).  
 
3.3.2 The variables of the ownership structure 
 
Based on previous studies, the authors used variables in the ownership structure of the enterprise 
as the main explanatory variable in regression models. Ownership variables were divided into two 
groups: the level of ownership concentration and the type of ownership structure. 
 
3.3.2.1 The level of ownership concentration  
 
Most previous studies used the total ownership rate of the five largest investors of the company 
(LARGEST). The authors applied this variable to reproduce the research results found in previous 
articles. In addition, this paper adding four indices less used in previous studies on the impact of the 
concentration ownership and financial decisions, the Herfindahl index (or H-index). The Herfindahl 
index or Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI or H-index) is employed to measure the level of 
ownership concentration /dispersion for a given field. Initially, it was used to evaluate the level of 
competition in the market or an industry by the formula: 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠௜ଶ௡௜ୀଵ   
In particular, si is the market share of the company i in a certain markets/sectors. Herfindahl 
index takes the values from 0 to 1, in which, the smaller the value, the more perfect the competition 
in the industry (each company occupies a small market share, no dominant or monopoly company). 
As H-index is closer to 1, the level of concentration in the industry is higher, indicating that the 
company occupies a dominant market share than the rest or monopoly companies. 
Currently, in the researches of finance, H-index is widely used to express the concentration - 
dispersion of various areas. Hence, the authors apply this indicator to measure the level of 
concentration - dispersion of the ownership structure of listed companies. In particular, assume that 
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in a listed company there are n major shareholders, with the volume of shares owned by each 
shareholder being sharei, Herfindahl index for all large stockholders will be computed by to the 
formula: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ௦௛௔௥௘௦భమା௦௛௔௥௘௦మమା⋯ା௦௛௔௥௘௦೙మ(௦௛௔௥௘௦భା௦௛௔௥௘௦మା⋯ା௦௛௔௥௘௦೙)మ  
The authors calculated Herfindahl index in each company for all corporation’s large 
shareholders (HINDEX_ALL), for the five biggest investors of the company (HINDEX_LARGE), 
institutional investors (HINDEX_INSTI) and foreign investors (HINDEX_FOREIGN). 
 
3.3.2.2 Types of ownership structures 
 
The researchers divide the types of ownership structures into the following groups: state ownership 
(STATE), institutional ownership (INSTITUTION), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and managerial 
ownership (MANAGER). These variables are computed according to the total ownership rate of the 
types of ownership structures in the enterprise. 
 
3.3.3 Control variables 
 
In addition to the main explanatory variables mentioned above, the paper applies other important 
independent variables as control variables affecting the dependent variables. Specifically, the study 
employs the size of the company, the level of available fixed assets, the level of cash flow, the 
short-term solvency, the operating duration as a joint stock firm and the growth rate. SIZE, the size 
of the company, is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets. 
TANGIBILITY, calculated as dividing total net fixed asset value by total assets. CF_RATIO, cash 
flow factor, is the sum of the annual fixed asset depreciation and net profit to total asset. 
LIQUIDITY, short-term solvency, is measured by the proportion of money and cash equivalents in 
total assets. AGEINC, the number of years the company operates as a joint stock company. Finally, 
MB (Market to book ratio), computed as the market value to the book value ratio, reflects the growth 
of the business. The MB ratio is calculated by the market capitalization (the market value of the 
company) divided by the book value of the share capital (book value). This factor is large, which 
means that the market evaluates the growth prospects of the business good and vice versa, small 
coefficient means that the business has less opportunity of growth. Growth-stage companies often 
have high MB ratios, while companies in stable and mature stages often have low MB.  
 
3.4 Models and research methods 
 
3.4.1 Probability models 
 
As for dividend policy, the authors researched initially on the effect of ownership structure on a 
probability of dividend payout in a year by conducting regressive the dependent variables – 
PAYOUT, will be a dummy variable received value of 1 if a company payouts dividends in a year, 
and a variable will receive value of 0 if the company does not payout dividends. To conduct this 
regression, the simplest way is that carries out a common regression OLS. That model will be 
called as Linear Probability Model (LPM): 
Pr (𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇 = 1|𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)௜,௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜇௧ + 𝜀௜,௧           (1) 
However, the LPM has few limitations in its structure leading to a using way to assess the 
probability of dividend payout is not really suitable. Firstly, the models use a regular linear 
regression, while the probability of paying dividends or not are only given in the range of 0% to 
100%. Using conventional OLS can lead to a condition when evaluating the impact, the probability 
of estimation from the model can be as low as 0% or higher than 100%. Secondly, the regression 
factor from the LPM model is the slope of the line from the model. The change in the ownership rate 
of one unit or one standard deviation will be the same in all cases. For example, the effect of the 
concentration of ownership structure is measured by the state ownership ratio (STATE) for the 
probability of paying dividends as the percentage of ownership increases from 3% to 4%, just like in 
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the case of state ownership increasing from 50% to 51% from this model. Thus, the effect of 
ownership structure on dividend payoffs from LPM models does not adequately reflect the true 
impact.  
To overcome these problems, the team performed probit regression and logistic regression, 
which is suitable for regressing dependent variables as binary variables (dummy). Probit and 
logistic distribution are limited to the range 0 to 1, which is consistent with the study of the impact of 
the ownership structure on the probability of dividends paid by the firm. The probit and logit models 
have the equation as follows: 
Probit model: 
Pr (𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇 = 1|𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)௜,௧ = 𝛷(𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜,௧)               (2) 
Logistic model (logit) 
Pr (𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑂𝑈𝑇 = 1|𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)௜,௧ = 𝐿(𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜,௧)                 (3) 
In particular, OWNERSHIPit is the ownership variable of company i in year t related to the 
level of concentration of ownership structure and types of ownership structure. Controlit is the 
control variable of the company i in year t. 
 
3.4.2 Tobit model with blocked dependent variables  
 
The next segment of the dividend policy that the authors would like to investigate is the level of 
dividends paid. The main dependent variable here is POR, dividend payout ratio. This dependent 
variable is characterized by a censored value. POR is calculated based on the total dividend payout 
on total after-tax profit. The profit from the business activities can be settled in two ways: retained 
for reinvestment in subsequent projects or paid in the form of dividends to shareholders. Therefore, 
the value of POR, though continuous, is blocked to the left at 0% (when the company does not pay 
dividends but retains all the profits for reinvestment) or right at the 100% (When the company pays 
the whole dividends and does not retain any profit). Thus, OLS regression is generally not 
appropriate for this dependent variable. 
The study, therefore, used the Tobit regression model to look at the effect of ownership 
structure on the level of dividend payments. The Tobit model is particularly suited to regressions 
where the dependent variable is blocked as in this case. 
𝑃𝑂𝑅௜,௧∗ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃௜,௧ + 𝛽ᇱ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙௜,௧ + 𝛾௜ + 𝜇௧ + 𝜀௜,௧                    (4) 
In addition, the authors used an additional variable to measure the dividend payout level of the 
business, which is the number of dividends per DPS share to compare with the POR. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The dividend, ownership structure and control variables are initially examined with exploratory data 
analysis based on the descriptive statistics and the results are shown in Table 1. The number of 
observations of the ownership structure of listed firms is not as much as those of the characteristics 
of the business. Among them, the most observations are the ownership of institutional investors 
and foreign investors (3828 observations). The Herfindahl index is smaller (the lowest is 3754 H-
index for foreign investors and the highest is 3768 H-index for the total number of important 
investors), because the authors can only calculate H-index if there is sufficient data on the 
ownership of key investors of listed companies in the two markets. Not all companies have foreign 
investors holding shares; therefore, the number of observations on H-index of foreign investors is 
lower. 
In terms of value, the average state ownership rate in the entire sample was 21.96% (median 
only 11.04%), the largest was 79.56%, which indicates that state ownership in listed companies is 
not high. Institutional investors tend to hold a higher proportion, at an average of 38.19% (with a 
median value of 40.87%) and institutional ownership of foreign investors is high above 96%. 
Foreign investors during the period 2009-2015 have average ownership rate in listed companies 
relatively low, reaching only 8.95% and the largest is 49%. This is in line with government’s 
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regulations during this time on the limits of the room of foreign investors. It is remarkable that from 
1st September 2015, Decree 60/2015/ND-CP officially came into effect. This Decree amends and 
supplements Decree No. 58/2012/ND-CP detailing and guiding the implementation of a number of 
articles of the Law on Securities and the Law on Amendment, and adds several articles of the Law 
on Securities with the addition of 2a, which gives room for foreign investors up to 100%. However, 
the data shows that at the end of 2015, the market and foreign investors have not yet conducted 
the adjustments in accordance with the new regulation of Decree 60, and the level of foreign 
ownership in listed enterprises maintains up to 49%. The average managerial ownership rate is 
only 5.7%, expressing that allowing managers to own shares to minimize interest conflicts between 
managers and shareholders remains relatively restricted. However, some companies allow their 
managers to own a large share proportion up to 55.5%. 
 
Table 1. Statistics describe the data 
 
Variables Number of observations Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Corporate ownership structure 
STATE 3827 0.2196 0.1104 0.2445 0.7956 0.0000 
INSTITUTION 3828 0.3819 0.4087 0.2605 0.9603 0.0000 
FOREIGN 3828 0.0895 0.0000 0.1637 0.4900 0.0000 
MANAGER 3827 0.0570 0.0062 0.1098 0.5550 0.0000 
LARGEST 3827 0.4669 0.5095 0.2268 0.9672 0.0000 
HINDEX_ALL 3768 0.3718 0.3068 0.2434 0.9999 0.0000 
HINDEX_LARGE 3761 0.4525 0.3834 0.2200 0.9999 0.0000 
HINDEX_INSTI 3761 0.5940 0.5741 0.3120 1.0000 0.0000 
HINDEX_FOREIGN 3754 0.2964 0.0000 0.3729 1.0000 0.0000 
Corporate statistics 
CS 4257 0.5080 0.5315 0.2226 0.9417 0.0419 
STD 4258 0.4042 0.3947 0.2109 0.9013 0.0291 
LTD 4260 0.1050 0.0365 0.1462 0.6388 0.0000 
BANKD 4260 0.1673 0.1186 0.1739 0.6772 0.0000 
INVEST 4259 0.0551 0.0254 0.0784 0.4292 0.0000 
PAYOUT 4494 0.6987 1.0000 0.4589 1.0000 0.0000 
POR 3405 0.2102 0.1752 0.2075 0.9911 0.0000 
DPS 4046 1076 800 1343 21000 0.0000 
ROA 4260 0.0654 0.0481 0.0750 0.3611 -0.1374 
ROE 4256 0.1333 0.1210 0.1401 0.6867 -0.3569 
TOBINQ 4258 0.9504 0.8878 0.4666 3.3192 0.1021 
SIZE 4261 26.8282 26.7534 1.4547 30.7261 23.5302 
TANGIBILITY 4261 0.2128 0.1425 0.2072 0.8707 0.0003 
CF_RATIO 4258 0.1017 0.0783 0.1045 0.6285 -0.1122 
AGEINC 4449 9.0967 9.0000 4.1373 26.0000 1.0000 
MB 3604 1.0253 0.8246 0.7726 4.4765 0.1186 
LIQUIDITY 4261 0.1030 0.0596 0.1170 0.5852 0.0007 
 
Regarding the concentration ownership level, the average ownership of the 5 biggest investors was 
46.69% with the median level of 50.95% and the highest value of 96.72%. This shows that, in many 
companies, stock ownership is concentrated in the hands of the largest investors. Herfindahl index 
data describe a clearer picture of the level of ownership concentration. The H-index of all major 
shareholders has an average of less than 0.5. This shows that the share ownership in Vietnamese 
enterprises on average is not too concentrated but not really dispersal. The value of the H-index of 
institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be 
concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. Meanwhile, the low value of H-indexes of 
foreign investors (0.2964) specifies that the allocation of ownership rate among investors is more 
equal. 
For variable characteristics of the business, the debt ratio of listed companies in Vietnam 
tends to be relatively high (over 50% for mean and median values, and up to over 90%). Debt is 
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mainly short-term debt with a short-term debt to total assets ratio of approximately 40%. At the 
same time, the long-term debt to total assets ratio is averagely 10.50%. Although there are 
companies with a high bank loan ratio of over 67%, listed firms have a bank loan to total asset ratio 
of over 16.73%. This expresses that listed firms can access other sources of debt (for example, 
from bond issuance) and are not too dependent on bank loans. 
On average, listed firms have 9 years of operation as joint stock companies. The average 
Tobin's q and MB ratios at approximately 1 indicate show that, companies listed on the two stick 
exchanges of Vietnam are mature firms (market value is close to book value). Other variables also 
indicate that. For example, the rate of cash holdings is low (average 10.30% with a median of 
approximately 6%); the probability of paying a average dividend is high (69.87%); average 
investment rate is low (5.51%); average asset size is 448 billion dong (natural logarithm of 26.8282) 
with the highest level of 22 trillion dong. 
 
4.2 The probability of dividend payout 
 
The regression effect of the degree of concentration of ownership structure on the probability of 
dividends payment is shown in Table 3. It can be seen that the results of all three models of 
probability are relatively uniform. The concentration of ownership structure is positively correlated 
and statistically significant (at 1%) with the largest shareholder-owned, the H-index of all major 
investors and the H-index of the largest shareholders in the business. The H-index of institutional 
investors and foreign investors has no statistically significant impact. In terms of economic 
meaning, with the LPM model, equation (2), a one standard deviation of HINDEX_ALL led to 
increase 3.54% the dividends payout ability during the year. Thus, this result is consistent with the 
H1 of the study: the degree of ownership concentration has the same impact as the probability of 
paying dividends of listed companies. 
 
Table 2. The centralized ownership structure level & the probability of dividends  
 
Dependent 
variable: 
PAYOUT 
LPM model Probit model Logistic model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Constant -0.0376 -0.0839 -0.0868 -0.1821 -0.1111 -1.9990** -2.1363*** -2.1213** -2.4823*** -2.2171*** -3.6390*** -3.8286*** -3.8432*** -4.4492*** -4.0108*** 
 (-0.16) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.71) (-0.45) (-2.45) (-2.58) (-2.56) (-2.88) (-2.66) (-2.60) (-2.72) (-2.71) (-3.03) (-2.81) 
LARGEST 0.2074***     0.6381***     1.0760***     
 (4.95)     (4.56)     (4.55)     
HINDEX 
_ALL 
 0.1454***     0.4679***     0.8306***    
 (2.90)     (2.79)     (2.87)    
HINDEX 
_LARGE 
  0.1676***     0.5503***     0.9659***   
  (3.02)     (2.97)     (3.02)   
HINDEX 
_INSTI 
   0.0403     0.1408     0.2468  
   (1.09)     (1.21)     (1.27)  
HINDEX 
_FOREIGN 
    -0.0120     -0.0470     -0.0648 
    (-0.40)     (-0.49)     (-0.41) 
SIZE 0.0104 0.0134 0.0128 0.0178** 0.0162* 0.0374 0.0462 0.0432 0.0616** 0.0556* 0.0723 0.0846* 0.0810 0.1123** 0.1023** 
 (1.23) (1.53) (1.45) (1.97) (1.83) (1.28) (1.56) (1.45) (2.03) (1.86) (1.45) (1.68) (1.60) (2.19) (2.01) 
TANGIBILITY 0.0030 -0.0086 -0.0127 0.0124 0.0215 -0.0946 -0.1206 -0.1363 -0.0509 -0.0221 -0.1994 -0.2674 -0.2904 -0.1386 -0.0793 
 (0.05) (-0.15) (-0.22) (0.21) (0.37) (-0.51) (-0.64) (-0.72) (-0.27) (-0.12) (-0.63) (-0.83) (-0.90) (-0.43) (-0.24) 
CF_RATIO 0.2485* 0.2369* 0.2379* 0.2494* 0.2274* 1.5467** 1.5369** 1.5209** 1.5954** 1.5047** 3.0821** 3.0469** 3.0060** 3.2363** 2.9849** 
 (1.96) (1.75) (1.76) (1.85) (1.68) (2.46) (2.35) (2.34) (2.42) (2.27) (2.23) (2.15) (2.16) (2.22) (2.09) 
LIQUIDITY 0.5237*** 0.5223*** 0.5123*** 0.5426*** 0.5303*** 2.1783*** 2.2506*** 2.1637*** 2.3086*** 2.2042*** 3.9053*** 3.9899*** 3.8598*** 4.1053*** 3.9363*** 
 (6.76) (6.51) (6.32) (6.74) (6.52) (5.82) (5.84) (5.66) (5.98) (5.79) (5.37) (5.35) (5.21) (5.49) (5.33) 
AGE_INC 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0099*** 0.0093*** 0.0090*** 0.0340*** 0.0340*** 0.0337*** 0.0312*** 0.0303*** 0.0553*** 0.0564*** 0.0556*** 0.0512*** 0.0496*** 
 (3.55) (3.45) (3.40) (3.20) (3.12) (3.38) (3.32) (3.31) (3.08) (3.01) (3.18) (3.19) (3.17) (2.96) (2.87) 
ROE 0.8337*** 0.8624*** 0.8669*** 0.8604*** 0.8916*** 2.6332*** 2.6855*** 2.7097*** 2.6739*** 2.8107*** 4.8987*** 5.0603*** 5.0953*** 4.9741*** 5.2872*** 
 (8.08) (8.05) (8.13) (8.00) (8.35) (5.63) (5.57) (5.65) (5.53) (5.75) (4.85) (4.91) (5.01) (4.75) (5.00) 
MB -0.0021 0.0047 0.0038 0.0026 -0.0000 0.0303 0.0526 0.0505 0.0438 0.0322 0.0360 0.0764 0.0726 0.0616 0.0419 
 (-0.15) (0.32) (0.26) (0.18) (-0.00) (0.51) (0.88) (0.85) (0.73) (0.54) (0.33) (0.70) (0.67) (0.56) (0.38) 
Controlling for 
The fixed sectionimpact Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The fixed year impact Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3592 3523 3517 3515 3510 3592 3523 3517 3515 3510 3592 3523 3517 3515 3510 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.1822 0.1811 0.1804 0.1760 0.1756 0.1755 0.1751 0.1738 0.1708 0.1697 0.1813 0.1815 0.1803 0.1769 0.1761 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of  
Interdisciplinary Studies 
Vol 8 No 2 
July 2019 
 
 141
Table 3. The type of ownership structure & the probability of dividends. 
 
Dependent  
variable:  
PAYOUT 
LPM model Probit model Logistic model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Constant 0.0601 0.1025 -0.0946 -0.0491 0.1214 -1.6535** -1.5445* -2.1855*** -2.0602** -1.4537* -3.0850** -2.8790** -3.9743*** -3.7642*** -2.7290* 
 (0.25) (0.44) (-0.40) (-0.20) (0.52) (-2.00) (-1.88) (-2.67) (-2.50) (-1.76) (-2.15) (-2.04) (-2.83) (-2.66) (-1.91) 
STATE 0.3115***    0.2022*** 1.0691***    0.7472*** 1.8386***    1.2970*** (7.37)    (3.78) (7.14)    (4.05) (7.11)    (4.11) 
INSTITUTION  0.2912***   0.1900***  0.9284***   0.5818***  1.5892***   0.9793***  (7.38)   (3.68)  (6.88)   (3.43)  (6.89)   (3.43) 
FOREIGN   -0.0207  0.0109   -0.0554  0.0560   -0.1142  0.0684   (-0.21)  (0.11)   (-0.17)  (0.17)   (-0.19)  (0.12) 
MÂNAGER    -0.1976** 0.0601    -0.5610** 0.2565    -0.9901** 0.3741    (-2.29) (0.68)    (-2.15) (0.95)    (-2.25) (0.83) 
SIZE 0.0083 0.0058 0.0154* 0.0142 0.0049 0.0284 0.0215 0.0536* 0.0502* 0.0169 0.0576 0.0455 0.1002** 0.0945* 0.0379 
 (0.97) (0.69) (1.78) (1.64) (0.58) (0.95) (0.73) (1.83) (1.70) (0.57) (1.12) (0.91) (2.00) (1.87) (0.74) 
TANGIBILITY -0.0373 -0.0158 0.0205 0.0177 -0.0399 -0.2643 -0.1710 -0.0365 -0.0439 -0.2769 -0.5138 -0.3447 -0.1081 -0.1207 -0.5360* 
 (-0.67) (-0.28) (0.36) (0.31) (-0.72) (-1.41) (-0.92) (-0.19) (-0.23) (-1.48) (-1.61) (-1.08) (-0.34) (-0.38) (-1.67) 
CF_RATIO 0.2310* 0.2153* 0.2816** 0.2738** 0.2077* 1.5510** 1.4398** 1.6886*** 1.6567*** 1.4507** 3.0502** 2.8628** 3.4471** 3.3624** 2.8477** 
 (1.83) (1.69) (2.19) (2.12) (1.65) (2.48) (2.31) (2.63) (2.59) (2.34) (2.29) (2.15) (2.42) (2.40) (2.16) 
LIQUIDITY 0.4929*** 0.4711*** 0.5382*** 0.5190*** 0.4706*** 2.0425*** 1.9951*** 2.2246*** 2.1672*** 1.9784*** 3.6083*** 3.5310*** 3.9902*** 3.8716*** 3.4836*** 
 (6.50) (6.14) (6.83) (6.61) (6.22) (5.60) (5.37) (5.93) (5.80) (5.41) (5.15) (4.93) (5.50) (5.38) (4.95) 
AGE_INC 0.0098*** 0.0103*** 0.0094*** 0.0097*** 0.0102*** 0.0346*** 0.0355*** 0.0313*** 0.0325*** 0.0357*** 0.0568*** 0.0576*** 0.0512*** 0.0534*** 0.0583*** 
 (3.44) (3.66) (3.26) (3.37) (3.58) (3.42) (3.48) (3.11) (3.21) (3.49) (3.23) (3.26) (2.96) (3.06) (3.28) 
ROE 0.8033*** 0.8182*** 0.8357*** 0.8394*** 0.8021*** 2.5347*** 2.6029*** 2.6083*** 2.6142*** 2.5492*** 4.7146*** 4.8537*** 4.7974*** 4.8427*** 4.7500*** 
 (7.99) (7.93) (8.13) (8.09) (7.89) (5.54) (5.58) (5.59) (5.59) (5.55) (4.90) (4.94) (4.76) (4.83) (4.91) 
MB 0.0070 0.0010 0.0010 0.0014 0.0049 0.0707 0.0449 0.0415 0.0435 0.0632 0.1096 0.0640 0.0550 0.0598 0.0966 
 (0.52) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.36) (1.24) (0.74) (0.71) (0.73) (1.10) (1.04) (0.58) (0.52) (0.55) (0.91) 
Controlling for 
The fixed section impact Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The fixed year impact Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 3592 3593 3593 3592 3592 3592 3593 3593 3592 3592 3592 3593 3593 3592 3592 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.1959 0.1957 0.1734 0.1748 0.2011 0.1897 0.1875 0.1685 0.1695 0.1943 0.1955 0.1933 0.1745 0.1757 0.2001 
 
Table 3 presents the regression results of the probability of paying dividends models of listed 
companies in Vietnam by types of ownership structure. The State ownership and ownership of 
institutional investors’ ratios were positively and statistically significant in all three models (1% 
significance). This is in line with the hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 that the authors published in 
Section 3. The study did not find significant impact of foreign shareholders ownership on the 
probability of paying dividends. For the ownership of managers, despite a negative and statistically 
significant 5% in equation (1), in equation (2), in the presence of all remaining ownership ratios, the 
ownership ratio of managers has no statistically significant impact on the probability of dividends 
paid by the business. 
To sum up, through the research on the probability of paying dividends, it can be seen that the 
degree of concentration of ownership structure, the State’s ownership and ownership of institutional 
investors have a positive effect with respect to decision making to pay dividends of listed 
companies on the Vietnam stock market. 
 
4.3 The dividend payout level 
 
In this section, the study used two measurement targets to calculate corporate dividends, POR and 
DPS. The characteristics of both indexes are that these are two censored indicators. POR is 
blocked by 0% and 100% and DPS is blocked to the left at 0 dong / stock. As a result, the results 
from the OLS regression will not really reflect the impact of the ownership structure on the level of 
enterprise dividends. Therefore, using Tobit regression will be consistent with the two indicators 
mentioned in Section 3. 
The study conducted regress the Tobit impacting the degree of concentration of ownership 
structure and types of ownership structure on the dividend payout ratio POR with the blocked left 
and right dividends target on each DPS stock with left-stop levels. The results for the degree of 
ownership structure concentration was shown in Table 4 and the results of the types of ownership 
structure in Table 5. The regression models with dependent variable from (1) to (5) are the DPS 
and the ones from (6) to (10) with the dependent variable are the POR 
Similar to the probability of dividends payout, we found a positive and statistically significant 
correlation between the degree of concentration of ownership structure, the State-owned and the 
ownership of Institutional investors with dividends paid level (both for DPS and POR). This is 
consistent with the assumptions H1, H2 and H3. We also found no significant impact of foreign 
ownership on the level of dividends paid. The ownership ratio of managers who are considered 
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separately is significantly negative and statistically significant at 1%, but when considered together 
with other ownership ratios, the coefficient impact of managerial ownership becomes statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Table 4: The level of ownership concentration and enterprise’s dividend payout 
 
 Dividend per DPS share Dividend payout ratio POR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -2684.1955*** -2788.4300*** -2756.6227*** -2811.8536*** -2849.7166*** -0.0254 -0.0448 -0.0547 -0.1359 -0.0626 
 (-3.26) (-3.29) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.35) (-0.16) (-0.27) (-0.33) (-0.76) (-0.37) 
LARGEST 529.1581***     0.1367***     
 (3.65)     (4.94)     
HINDEX 
_ALL 
 237.4754     0.1155***    
 (1.61)     (3.57)    
HINDEX 
_LARGE 
  294.5346*     0.1296***   
  (1.82)     (3.59)   
HINDEX 
_INSTI 
   -13.1584     0.0376  
   (-0.11)     (1.46)  
HINDEX 
_FOREIGN 
    -105.9215     -0.0214 
    (-1.09)     (-1.07) 
SIZE 30.1060 40.2519 37.5832 44.0198 46.8848 -0.0043 -0.0028 -0.0030 0.0011 -0.0005 
 (1.04) (1.35) (1.25) (1.46) (1.56) (-0.76) (-0.48) (-0.51) (0.17) (-0.08) 
TANGIBILITY -457.6692** -499.7767*** -516.2725*** -457.1896** -459.4994** 0.0050 -0.0052 -0.0075 0.0078 0.0132 
 (-2.47) (-2.71) (-2.78) (-2.46) (-2.46) (0.13) (-0.13) (-0.19) (0.19) (0.32) 
CF_RATIO 3143.3323*** 2997.8786*** 3003.9199*** 2992.6323*** 2978.2752*** 0.0353 0.0268 0.0267 0.0390 0.0271 
 (4.69) (4.40) (4.41) (4.41) (4.35) (0.47) (0.35) (0.35) (0.49) (0.35) 
LIQUIDITY 1855.7597*** 1885.6862*** 1850.0699*** 1908.8635*** 1906.0336*** 0.2666*** 0.2755*** 0.2707*** 0.2905*** 0.2854*** 
 (5.46) (5.36) (5.21) (5.40) (5.41) (5.22) (5.33) (5.20) (5.59) (5.43) 
AGE_INC 41.6813*** 40.2384*** 40.1575*** 38.1592*** 38.1767*** 0.0043** 0.0045** 0.0043** 0.0039** 0.0035* 
 (3.98) (3.84) (3.81) (3.67) (3.69) (2.36) (2.38) (2.27) (2.09) (1.88) 
ROE 4355.1427*** 4513.9410*** 4522.4306*** 4533.1451*** 4610.5529*** -0.0217 -0.0198 -0.0161 -0.0161 -0.0012 
 (8.40) (8.64) (8.65) (8.63) (8.67) (-0.28) (-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.02) 
MB 218.7517*** 222.0038*** 220.3979*** 214.8432*** 207.8231*** 0.0277** 0.0316*** 0.0310*** 0.0294** 0.0271** 
 (2.92) (2.89) (2.87) (2.77) (2.70) (2.43) (2.72) (2.67) (2.50) (2.33) 
Control for 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3582 3514 3508 3506 3501 3197 3137 3131 3130 3129 
Pseudo R2 0.0316 0.0312 0.0311 0.0310 0.0311 0.1121 0.1104 0.1102 0.1009 0.0982 
 
Table 5. Types of ownership structure and level of dividend payout  
 
 Dividend per DPS share Dividend payout ratio POR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Constant -2481.2749*** -2302.9930*** -2831.6548*** -2637.7896*** -2284.6358*** 0.0244 0.0635 -0.0591 -0.0029 0.0751 
 (-3.02) (-2.84) (-3.42) (-3.20) (-2.79) (0.16) (0.41) (-0.36) (-0.02) (0.48) 
STATE 781.8406***    410.7938** 0.1846***    0.1027*** (5.64)    (2.24) (6.54)    (2.91) 
INSTITUTION  831.0404***   595.3271***  0.1905***   0.1274***  (5.93)   (3.11)  (7.14)   (3.65) 
FOREIGN   -243.6403  -169.1163   -0.0605  -0.0458   (-0.84)  (-0.57)   (-1.05)  (-0.78) 
MANAGER    -782.4452*** -33.7488    -0.2087*** -0.0393    (-2.72) (-0.11)    (-3.16) (-0.58) 
SIZE 26.1936 16.2308 43.2001 37.5540 15.8396 -0.0051 -0.0073 -0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0076 
 (0.90) (0.56) (1.48) (1.28) (0.55) (-0.90) (-1.32) (-0.19) (-0.48) (-1.36) 
TANGIBILITY -551.6442*** -505.9541*** -417.0420** -428.3684** -552.0187*** -0.0145 -0.0024 0.0137 0.0109 -0.0125 
 (-3.02) (-2.72) (-2.26) (-2.33) (-3.01) (-0.37) (-0.06) (0.34) (0.28) (-0.33) 
CF_RATIO 3100.2921*** 3040.6689*** 3221.4174*** 3189.8019*** 3030.7445*** 0.0259 0.0108 0.0559 0.0438 0.0073 
 (4.63) (4.58) (4.80) (4.76) (4.55) (0.35) (0.14) (0.75) (0.59) (0.10) 
LIQUIDITY 1786.4154*** 1708.0510*** 1891.3483*** 1812.4395*** 1705.4105*** 0.2526***0.2354***0.2757*** 0.2552*** 0.2333*** 
 (5.35) (5.04) (5.57) (5.33) (5.07) (5.12) (4.67) (5.39) (5.00) (4.72) 
AGE_INC 41.0249*** 42.9492*** 39.9472*** 41.2855*** 42.7481*** 0.0041** 0.0045** 0.0039** 0.0042** 0.0044** 
 (3.90) (4.08) (3.84) (3.96) (4.03) (2.17) (2.44) (2.11) (2.27) (2.39) 
ROE 4280.2858*** 4317.5481*** 4346.5726*** 4366.1131*** 4284.7004*** -0.0486 -0.0306 -0.0300 -0.0202 -0.0417 
 (8.38) (8.32) (8.41) (8.42) (8.32) (-0.64) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.54) 
MB 242.1730*** 227.3692*** 225.6771*** 228.7786*** 234.2524*** 0.0340***0.0303***0.0299*** 0.0306*** 0.0324*** 
 (3.30) (3.01) (3.03) (3.04) (3.13) (3.10) (2.61) (2.65) (2.65) (2.88) 
Control for 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3582 3583 3583 3582 3582 3197 3197 3197 3197 3197 
Pseudo R2 0.0323 0.0325 0.0312 0.0314 0.0327 0.1279 0.1322 0.0983 0.1048 0.1395 
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4.4 Subsample testing of the relationship between Ownership structure and profit distribution on 
HOSE and HNX 
 
We reconsiders regressions about the distribution of listed companies' profits in two ways: the 
affordability of dividend payout and the level of dividend payout. For the affordability of dividend 
payout, the two models used are LPM and Logistic to determine the probability of dividend payout 
of listed companies in each sub-sample. With level of dividend payout, we still implements the Tobit 
regression for the two dependent variables: dividend payout ratio (POR) and dividends per share 
(DPS). The regression results are reported in Table 6. 
The decision to distribute profits of listed companies on the HNX tends to be more affected by 
the ownership structure, especially the probability of enterprises paying dividends in the year. In 
HNX enterprises, the degree of ownership structure (except for the degree of ownership 
concentration of foreign investors) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (at least 
5%). Meanwhile, the degree of ownership concentration of listed companies on HOSE is only 
positively and positively correlated with the probability of paying dividends in the proportion of 
ownership of the largest investors. In listed companies on HOSE and HNX, the proportion of state 
ownership and institutional investors has a positive impact on the company's dividend payment 
decision. However, for companies listed on the HOSE, the ownership ratio of managers is inversely 
proportional to the ability to pay dividends. The result of dividend payout through DPS and POR is 
similar to the dividend payout ratio of the business. 
 
Table 6. Ownership Structure and Dividend Payout Decision on HOSE and HNX 
 
Dependent variables: PAYOUT Part A: The probability of dividend payout of the business HOSE HNX 
Models LPM Logistic LPM Logistic 
LARGEST 0.1592*** 0.8255** 0.2377*** 1.2834*** 
 (2.65) (2.30) (4.04) (3.96) 
HINDEX_ALL 0.0600 0.4439 0.2093*** 1.1519*** 
 (0.77) (0.95) (3.21) (3.10) 
HINDEX_LARGE 0.0608 0.4740 0.2562*** 1.4270*** 
 (0.72) (0.96) (3.47) (3.36) 
HINDEX_INSTI -0.0773 -0.3238 0.1179** 0.6367** 
 (-1.39) (-1.03) (2.45) (2.53) 
HINDEX_FOREIGN -0.0039 -0.0203 -0.0182 -0.0946 
 (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.42) (-0.40) 
STATE 0.2966*** 1.7579*** 0.3320*** 1.9702*** 
 (4.58) (4.48) (5.78) (5.73) 
INSTITUTION 0.2593*** 1.4138*** 0.3256*** 1.8235*** 
 (4.40) (3.94) (5.89) (5.86) 
FOREIGN -0.0906 -0.4931 -0.0637 -0.4871 
 (-0.68) (-0.62) (-0.51) (-0.60) 
MANAGER -0.2457** -1.2153** -0.1011 -0.5153 
 (-2.27) (-2.09) (-0.66) (-0.69) 
Part B: level of dividend payout (Tobit) 
 DPS POR DPS POR 
LARGEST 641.7582*** 0.1288*** 483.4834** 0.1453*** 
 (2.98) (3.01) (2.48) (4.04) 
HINDEX_ALL 152.7144 0.0896* 318.1484* 0.1181*** 
 (0.64) (1.71) (1.71) (2.80) 
HINDEX_LARGE 146.6467 0.0863 442.3696** 0.1493*** 
 (0.56) (1.54) (2.17) (3.05) 
HINDEX_INSTI -224.6784 -0.0001 99.8418 0.0508 
 (-1.25) (-0.00) (0.66) (1.52) 
HINDEX_FOREIGN -97.0865 -0.0059 -132.3660 -0.0326 
 (-0.61) (-0.20) (-1.07) (-1.17) 
STATE 994.8795*** 0.2245*** 724.3548*** 0.1518*** 
 (4.56) (4.86) (3.97) (4.04) 
INSTITUTION 1024.9585*** 0.1981*** 719.5136*** 0.1863*** 
 (4.64) (4.69) (4.09) (5.25) 
FOREIGN -253.5465 -0.1064 -373.5734 -0.0270 
 (-0.63) (-1.39) (-1.04) (-0.30) 
MANAGER -1317.6005*** -0.2372*** 61.7312 -0.1268 
 (-3.29) (-2.84) (0.14) (-1.15) 
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4.5 Robustness tests 
 
In this part, some tests are conducted to check the model quality to ensure the results were 
meaningful. In addition, robustness tests are also aimed at identifying defects of the model, dealing 
with some possible endogeneity problems. 
We retakes some basic regression models (focusing on GMM, LPM, Logit, Tobit) using 
dummy variables in the ownership structure of the business. Here, we establishes dummy variables 
that receive value 1 if the level of ownership concentration (the ownership proportion of largest 
investors and H-index of all major investors) and Ownership type (state ownership, institutional 
investors, foreign investors and managers) of the firm is high and it gets value 0 if low. High level is 
defined as the level of ownership that is higher than the average of the overall sample (except H-
index, H-index> 0.5). When using dummy variables as independent variables in the model, the 
significance of the regression coefficients becomes the mean value comparison of financial 
decisions, performance and corporate value among listed companies. They have a high ownership 
structure as well as level of concentration and a high ownership proportion of ownership compared 
to companies with a dispersed ownership structure and a low ownership ratio. 
The regression results of the dummy variables are similar to the regression results found in 
the main study. Listed firms have a high degree of ownership concentration, the proportion of state 
ownership and ownership of institutional investors tend to pay more dividends than firms with 
dispersed ownership. State ownership and institutional investors are low. At the same time, firms 
with high ownership of managers tend to pay less dividends, but higher returns on equity. 
Issues such as heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation may be present in the regression and 
because collected data is panel data that has been resolved by the research team through using of 
White's robust heteroscedasticity-robust (1980) robustness and Petersen's sample-clustering 
robust (2009) to calculate the t-statistics and z-statistics values for testing the statistical significance 
of the results. 
One problem that can distort regression results is that of multipliers. These are two or more 
explanatory variables that are highly correlated with each other, or in other words, this independent 
variable can explain Linear for other independent variables. To look at this issue, it may be based 
on two directions. Firstly, according to the Pearson correlation matrix, it can be seen that the 
correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables used in the model are not too high except 
for some variables with similarly set up methods such as MB coefficient And Tobin's Q, the overall 
H-index and the largest investor’s H-index. During the study, the team did not put these highly 
correlated variables into the same regression model. Secondly, during the regression 
implementation, the team conducted a variance inflation factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity 
detection in the model. VIF is a test that is commonly used in research. With a regression model 
with k explanatory variables, the VIF of each variable is calculated as follows: 
𝑉𝐼𝐹௞ = ଵଵିோೖమ  
Where, R2k is the R2 value obtained from the independent variable regression k under the 
remaining independent variables. The VIF of the k variable is greater than 10 indicates that the 
explanatory variable k has a very serious collinearity and needs to be processed immediately. The 
VIF test results show that there are no multiple collinearities in the regression models of the study 
group (the VIF coefficients are small and have no coefficients that are greater than 10). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper focuses on the relationship between ownership structure and dividend policy of the firms 
in the Vietnamese market in the period from 2009 to 2015. We examine (1) the impact of ownership 
structure on the probability of dividend payment, and (2) whether ownership structure affects the 
decision of firms on the amount of dividend payment. 
The LPM regressions and the Logit regressions are used to test the impact of ownership 
structure on the probability of dividend payment. The Tobit regressions are used to test the impact 
of ownership structure on the amount of dividend payment. Firm’s characteristics are used as 
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control variables. Industry dummies and year dummies are used to capture the unobserved 
industry-specific and time-varies variables that could potentially affect the results in this paper. 
We found evidences that the level of concentration of ownership structure, state ownership 
and institutional investors' ownership have a positive effect on making decision whether to pay 
dividends of listed companies on the Vietnamese stock market, especially those listed on the HNX. 
State ownership and institutional investors' ownership have a positive impact on the level of 
dividend payout of an enterprise, but the ownership of foreign investors with the level of dividend 
payout of the business is not available with statistics. This is similar when considering the impact of 
ownership by the administrator. 
Research subjects may face the issue of survivorship bias due to the specific subject of 
research companies listed on the two stock exchanges of Vietnam, each of which has the listing 
rules and criteria separately. During the research period 2009-2015, there may be companies that 
are canceled or bankrupt (listed companies are still in the sample). Survivorship bias occurs when 
research takes into account only surviving companies in the sample during the study period but 
ignores the impact of companies that are no longer in the sample for a variety of reasons. To 
overcome this situation, as far as the data could be collected, the team put the company's delisted 
and bankruptcy companies in 2009-2015 into the sample. The regression results are similar to 
those found above. It is, therefore, possible to ensure that the results of the study are not severely 
affected by the survivorship bias. 
Regression results may also be biased and inconsistent, and test value such as t-statistics 
may deviate if the size of the overall sample is small. The sample of the research team has 4,494 
observations over time and according to the company. However, to ensure the research results, the 
team performs bootstrap analysis. The bootstrap method can help to increase the accuracy of 
testing through replication (Mackinnon, 2002). Using econometric software, replication was done 
1000 times to generate empirical t-statistics and the team was able to use t-statistics to test the 
statistical significance of the regression coefficients found in the subject. Although it is not reported 
here, the results from the bootstrap analysis are similar to those of the research team found above. 
Our study contributes to the gap of knowledge on the effect of ownership structure on many 
aspects of firm’s financial decisions, especially the distribution policy of firms in East Asia region. 
The findings may suggest some further studies in related issues. For instance, why ownership 
concentration shows the change of sign in different periods of time; or why foreign holdings do not 
have any impact on dividend policy, which is not consistent with both the incentive alignment 
hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis; etc.  
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